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Financial dollarization in Latin America has been growing over time in spite of a 
major reduction in inflation and a shift toward central bank independence.  After 
discussing the key stylized facts of dollarization and dedollarization in the region, 
we discuss the risks this process poses to the region.  In particular, we explore the 
validity of concerns about the effectiveness of monetary policy in a dollarized 
economy and about a loss of seigniorage revenue in such an economy.  After 
concluding that to a large extent these concerns lack empirical support, we focus 
on the main reason for concern: increased vulnerability due to the dollarization of 
public and private debt.  We emphasize the importance of 
precautionary/regulatory measures to limit the scope of mismatches originating 
from liability dollarization, and of developing financial instruments designed to 
hedge against currency risk.  Moreover, we deal with the experience of policies 
directly aimed at deepening domestic financial markets in local currency assets 
and in gradually lengthening the maturity of these assets.  We find that important 
lessons from the experience of dedollarization in Israel are of particular interest 
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3  4  1. Introduction 
 
Financial dollarization has been growing in Latin America over time in spite of a major 
reduction in inflation and a shift toward fiscal consolidation and central bank independence.  
Although in principle dollarization can exacerbate a typical Latin American economy’s 
vulnerability to adverse shocks (e.g., sudden stops), it is likely to remain a key feature of the 
region.  In fact, it is quite hard to think of political-economy incentives strong enough for 
policymakers to come up in the near future with explicit policy programs designed to actively 
reduce dollarization in the region.   
  If the phenomenon of dollarization is likely to remain in the region, then it is important to 
discuss how  “to live” with it while attenuating its potentially harmful effects and possibly 
reducing its depth. 
  After discussing the key stylized facts of dollarization and dedollarization in the region, 
we discuss the risks this process poses to the economies in the region.  There is no strong 
evidence to support the notion that dollarization seriously weakens the effectiveness of domestic 
monetary policy or the ability to raise seigniorage revenue.  Instead, there are good reasons to 
believe that the main policy concerns about dollarization have to do with increased 
vulnerabilities due to dollarized public and private sector debt.  In particular, sudden stops in 
capital inflows that are accompanied by a marked economic slowdown and a sharp depreciation 
of the domestic currency can set in motion a set of very difficult dynamics for public and private 
sector debt.  
  For this research project, we conducted a special survey of a set of policymakers in Latin 
American countries in order to understand efforts to dedollarize or to deal with dollarization. The 
results of the survey—whose questionnaire appears in the Appendix—suggest  that countries 
with high levels of dollarization are not adopting active and direct policies to reduce the level of 
dollarization. Dedollarization is expected to be a side effect of prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies, complemented with efforts to develop local currency debt markets or markets for CPI 
indexed financial instruments. Although policymakers are very aware of the risks of 
dollarization, it is surprising that very few countries are adopting policy measures to directly deal 
with them. The rest of the countries—those with moderate levels of dollarization—appear 
satisfied with their current levels of dollarization. 
5    Among the various ways of living with dollarization, we emphasize the importance of 
precautionary/regulatory measures that attempt to limit the scope of mismatches originating from 
liability dollarization, and of developing financial instruments designed to hedge against 
currency risk. We also discuss how partial dedollarization can be enhanced by policies aimed 
directly at deepening domestic financial markets in local currency assets and gradually 
lengthening the maturity of these assets.  We find that important lessons from the experience of 
dedollarization in Israel are of particular interest for Latin America. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the main stylized facts of 
dollarization in Latin America.  Section 3 highlights the main policy concerns about 
dollarization.  Sections 4 and 5 focus on how to live with dollarization and on the main lessons 
from failed attempts at dedollarization.  Section 6 draws the main lessons from Israel’s 
experience.  Section 7 concludes.   
 
2.  Dollarization Trends in Latin America:  Some Stylized Facts 
 
Dollarization of private and public sector assets and liabilities is widespread throughout Latin 
America. As part of a comprehensive set of structural reforms—some which came in the 
aftermath of financial crisis and hyperinflation—many Latin American countries liberalized and 
reformed their financial markets. In the process, strong linkages to the US dollar were developed, 
frequently through the adoption of strong pegs or quasi-fixed exchange rate arrangements, in a 
context of increased capital mobility. In many countries, restrictions on holding financial assets 
abroad, moving assets freely across the border, or issuing liabilities in foreign currency both 
locally or across the border, were lifted and competition between domestic and foreign 
currencies increased. In many cases this led to the dollarization of deposits and loans in the 
domestic financial system, to significant holdings of financial assets abroad, and in general to the 
issuance of foreign-denominated liabilities of the private and public sectors.  
Table 1 reports several measures of financial dollarization in Latin American countries 
with less-than-full dollarization, i.e., those that have not adopted the dollar as legal tender. A first 
view of the data reveals that in some form or another dollarization is a generalized phenomenon 
throughout the region. While some countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia or Venezuela have 
successfully contained the degree of dollarization in the domestic financial sector, financial 
dollarization tends to appear in the form of dollarization of public sector liabilities or as dollar-
6  denominated offshore deposits and loans. Hence, even in cases of moderate  “domestic” 
dollarization (following the terminology of Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003) such as 
Colombia, vulnerabilities associated with dollarization may still arise since the corporate sector 
may be exposed to balance sheet effects of exchange rate fluctuations via foreign indebtedness.
1  
Compared to other emerging market countries, dollarization in Latin America in 
any of its forms is high. While on average in non-Latin American emerging markets the share 
of dollar-denominated deposits and loans is around 22 percent and 19 percent respectively, in 
Latin America the average figures are closer to 37 percent and 40 percent. In some countries 
such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay more than half of deposits 
and loans are denominated in dollars.  
The dollarization of public sector liabilities is even higher in Latin America compared to 
other emerging markets. While in the rest of the emerging world the share of dollar-denominated 
public sector liabilities rounds 40 percent, in Latin America the average figure exceeds 75 
percent and more than 90 percent in several cases. 
While on average the dollarization of financial sector deposits and loans rose 
significantly during the 1990s with a sharp increase after the 1998 world financial markets crisis 
(Figure 1), the dollarization of public sector liabilities has remained relatively constant (Figure 
2). If anything, the share of dollar-denominated public debt has fallen slightly as domestic bond 
markets developed during the 1990s. 
 
Very High Dollarization:  The Cases of Bolivia and Peru 
 
High levels of inflation, low credibility about domestic macroeconomic policies, and chronic 
volatility associated with monetary financing of budget deficits induced a switch to dollar-
denominated assets. Here we expand on the cases of Bolivia and Peru—typical cases of financial 
dollarization in Latin America—which reflect this pattern closely.
2 As macroeconomic 
imbalances materialized during the 1980s, asset substitution led to larger holdings of dollar-
denominated deposits. However, despite the fact that macroeconomic balance was regained and 
that inflation was tamed, dollarization rates have remained high.  
                                                       
1 In fact, a recent study by Echeverry et al.(2003) suggests that exchange rate depreciations during the 1990s 
decreased the profitability of firms holding dollar-denominated debt. 
2 Uruguay is a similar case. A detailed discussion of Uruguay can be found in Licandro and Licandro (2003) 
7  Both Bolivia and Peru are cases in which dollarization expanded as the authorities 
increasingly relied on monetary financing of the fiscal deficit.  In Bolivia during the 1970s and 
1980s, fiscal policy was based on the premise that state enterprises (particularly in the mining 
industry) and large public investments, financed mainly through foreign bank credit, were 
growth-promoting vehicles. At the beginning of the 1980s, terms of trade deteriorated 
significantly (mainly because of a fall in the price of tin—the country’s principal export at the 
time), during a time when international interest rates suffered a significant hike. The combination 
of both factors produced a severe debt sustainability problem that led authorities to reschedule 
their foreign debt payments in 1981 (note that this happened two years before debt problems 
spread throughout the region).  
Due to the lack of external funding and the high fiscal deficits that were being run, 
central bank financing became the major funding vehicle for the government, leading to a 
hyperinflation episode in the middle of the decade. Financial dollarization rose as inflationary 
expectations reacted in the late 1970s (Figure 3). 
   In August 1985, authorities adopted a stabilization package aimed at targeting the fiscal 
deficit and increasing monetary policy independence. Privatizations, elimination of subsidies, a 
freeze on public sector wages, tax reform, financial, commercial and capital controls 
liberalization, in addition to a law of central bank independence, were the major components of 
the package. Inflation and the fiscal deficit were successfully reduced, but the dollarization of 
deposits continued growing rapidly until the early 1990s when it stabilized at levels close to 80 
percent of total deposits. 
The Peruvian experience is quite similar. Until 1990, the Peruvian Central Bank 
frequently financed the public sector and a whole range of state-owned development banks to 
promote the development of certain sectors. In the 1970s and 1980s, fiscal financing became the 
major component of monetary issuances. During the 1970s and early 1980s, Central Bank 
transfers to development banks were the principal source of monetary financing to the public 
sector. Later, after the 1985 debt crisis, the lack of financing sources for the public sector 
increased dependency on central bank credit. Between 1985 and 1990, an additional 
expansionary source was set up. In order to favor exports and subsidize imports of primary 
goods, a differential exchange rate regime was introduced, leading to further monetary 
expansion. The combination of the above factors led inflation to rise from single-digit levels to 
8  hyperinflation by the end of the 1980s.  Macroeconomic imbalances were closely followed by 
the dollarization of the Peruvian financial system. In order to avoid wealth losses due to the 
persistently high levels of inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, a process of substitution towards 
dollar-denominated assets took place (Figure 4). 
While in both cases, as well as in many other Latin American experiences, inflation was 
stabilized and macroeconomic accounts were returned to order, dollarization remained high. 
Standard portfolio theory has been used to explain such observed hysteresis in dollarization.  Ize 
and Levy-Yeyati (1998 and 2003), for example, use a static CAPM model with risk-averse 
borrowers and lenders to explain this phenomenon. They argue that domestic residents prefer to 
denominate contracts in foreign currency when its purchasing power in terms of domestic 
consumption is stable relative to that of domestic currency. In this setup, expected real exchange 
rate volatility relative to inflation volatility is the relevant driving force of dollarization. They 
find that in several of the dollarized South American countries real exchange rate volatility has 
declined as much or more than inflation volatility. Moreover, they argue that real exchange rate 
volatility is anchored by a long-term purchasing power condition, while future inflation is 
uncertain despite current low levels of inflation. 
In addition to portfolio considerations, persistent dollarization in Latin America can also 
reflect lack of credibility of monetary policy.
3 In this sense dollarization is a form of protection 
against debt repudiation via inflation. This view might appear less relevant today given the 
history of low inflation that many Latin American countries built up during the 1990s; however, 
it remains important given the region’s high level of indebtedness and the current stress on fiscal 
accounts.  
Accounting for the dollarization of public debt remains a tougher challenge. Many of the 
determinants discussed in the literature on financial sector dollarization have been used to 
explain the dollarization of public sector debt. Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2003) find 
that country size matters for the development of bond markets, suggesting that there might be 
economies of scale in the development of the infrastructure of local bond markets, including the 
fixed costs of establishing clearing and settlement systems and developing the legal framework 
for issuing and trading. Additionally, they find that inflation affects the development of local 
currency public bond markets adversely, that flexible exchange rate arrangements tend to 
                                                       
3 See Calvo and Guidotti (1990) for a discussion. 
9  promote domestic currency bond markets and that institutional development in the form of better 
democratic institutions impacts positively. In a study about the determinants of what they have 
labeled original sin (the impossibility of issuing external debt in domestic currency), 
Eichengreen, Haussman and Panizza (2003) find that only the size of the country matters, and to 
a lesser degree inflation history. Other possible determinants explored by the authors but that do 
not turn out to be significant in their regressions include exchange rate variability, the exchange 
rate regime, institutions, trade openness, and fiscal policy among others.   
 
3.  Why Should Policymakers Care about Dollarization? 
 
Despite a major decline in inflation, dollarization has deepened in Latin America. What policy 
concerns does this raise?  On the one hand, there is concern that dollarization can reduce the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. On the other, there is concern about the risks that dollarization 
poses for macroeconomic and financial stability and performance. 
Conventional views of partial dollarization relate it to monetary policy ineffectiveness. 
The main rationale behind this view is that under currency substitution the domestic central bank 
is not able to influence the relevant interest rate for consumption and investment decisions. 
Despite a significant volume of literature suggesting that monetary policy is much less effective 
in (partially) dollarized economies, empirical evidence does not support this view. Reinhart, 
Rogoff and Savastano (2003) do not find significant differences between the ability of monetary 
policy to contain inflation or to stabilize output across countries with different degrees of 
dollarization. Table 2 summarizes some evidence on this for Latin American countries. 
Regardless of the degree of dollarization, inflation has fallen throughout the region and 
differences in current inflation rates are not significant across different groups of countries when 
classified by level of dollarization. The same is true for GDP growth and its volatility, which are 
similar across groups of countries with different levels of dollarization. 
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) also explore whether dollarization leads to 
significant differences in the ability to raise revenue from seigniorage. The average revenue from 
money creation among Latin American countries during the mid-1990s and early 2000s ranged 
from 0.8 percent to 3.3 percent of GDP (Table 3). These figures are generally independent of the 
degree of dollarization. An important trend is that independent of the monetary policy carried out 
10  in each country and the degree of dollarization, seigniorage financing has been notably reduced 
throughout the region. 
The upshot of this discussion is that the ability to carry out an effective monetary policy 
does not seem to be a major cause of concern about dollarization. As Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
and Haussman, Panizza and Stein (2001) point out, dollarization limits the ability of central 
banks to increase interest rates to defend the currency due to fear of floating, however, this does 
not necessarily imply that it damages their ability to control inflation.  As a matter of fact, a 
relatively well-operating inflation-targeting scheme has been working since early 2002 in Peru, 
one of the most highly dollarized economies in the world, with quite satisfactory results thus far.    
If dollarization is of great concern for policymakers, it is probably for a different reason, 
namely, that it can exacerbate a country’s vulnerability to adverse shocks.  In what follows we 
deal with two main vulnerabilities: one arising from liability dollarization of the private sector, 
and the other one having to do with public debt dynamics.    
A recent strand of literature, mostly motivated by the  “Tequila” crisis of 1994-95, the Asian 
meltdown of 1997 and subsequent crises, has emphasized the importance of the vulnerabilities 
posed by dollarization. These events led many observers to suggest that the presence of debt 
denominated in foreign currency can reverse the expansionary impact of exchange rate 
depreciations common to the standard Mundell-Fleming framework. Moreover, analysts have 
suggested that dollarization itself can play a leading role in provoking self-fulfilling crises.
4 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003), for example, provide empirical evidence of the importance of 
liability dollarization as a predictor of sudden stops in capital flows for a sample of emerging 
market countries.   
Krugman (1999a), Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (2001, 2003), and Céspedes, Chang 
and Velasco (2002) were among the first to utilize what is now known as the open economy 
Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist framework to show that, in the presence of foreign currency debt, 
currency depreciations may be contractionary.
5 From an empirical standpoint two recent studies 
(Céspedes, 2003, and Galindo, Panizza, and Schiantarelli, 2003) use macroeconomic data to 
                                                       
4 Discussions can be found in Dornbusch (2003), Krugman (1999a, 1999b) and Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003). 
5 Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2002), for instance, show that the presence of liability dollarization (dollarization 
here stands for choosing debt denominated in any foreign currency) does not necessarily lead to contractionary 
depreciations. In particular, they show that depreciations can be contractionary only in the presence of very large 
levels of foreign currency debt and large imperfections in international capital markets. They find that the steady-
11  investigate whether the presence of dollar debt affects the relationship between economic activity 
and exchange rate depreciation. Both papers find that the presence of dollar debt reduces (up to 
the point of possibly making it negative) the expansionary effect of currency depreciations. In 
their baseline regression for instance, Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli find that depreciations 
are expansionary in countries with low levels of dollarization and that depreciations become 
contractionary in countries that have a substantial share of dollarization.
6  
In addition to cross-country studies, several papers have focused on vulnerabilities raised 
by dollarization from a firm-level perspective. There are a limited number of papers that focus on 
emerging market countries and use firm-level data to explore the issue of debt dollarization. 
Typically they analyze two related questions: (i) Do firms try to hedge by borrowing in foreign 
currency when they produce tradable goods and in domestic currency when they produce non-
tradables? (ii) Do firms with foreign currency debt suffer negative balance sheet effects from 
devaluations?  
Bleakley and Cowan (2002) attempt to answer both questions by using a sample of firms 
from five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico) over the 1991-
1999 period. They find that firms tend to match the currency composition of their liabilities with 
their ex-ante sensitivity of revenues to the real exchange rate. In other words, firms that produce 
tradable goods tend to hold more dollar debt than firms that produce non-tradables.  As a 
consequence of matching, Bleakley and Cowan find no evidence to support a negative balance 
sheet effect. On the contrary, they find that currency depreciations tend to benefit more firms 
with a larger share of foreign currency debt.   
In contrast to Bleakley and Cowan, a series of studies focusing on the impact of debt 
dollarization at the firm level for individual countries provides opposite results. Balance sheet 
effects of exchange rate fluctuations appear to be highly significant in countries with different 
degrees of dollarization. Echeverry et al. (2003) find that, despite low dollarization in Colombia, 
firms that borrow in dollars are not fully hedged and suffer from economic fluctuations. 
Bonomo, Martins and Pinto (2003) and Carranza, Cayo and Galdón-Sánchez (2003) find similar 
results for Brazil—another country with relatively low dollarization—and highly dollarized Peru, 
respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
state levels of debt and risk premia that are necessary to generate contractionary depreciations are unrealistically 
large. 
6 In their study, the authors analyze public sector dollarization as well as dollarization of deposits.  
12     In a study of the Asian crisis, Harvey and Roper (1999) find that balance sheet effects 
associated with debt dollarization played a significant role in propagating the crisis. They argue 
that Asian corporations were highly leveraged in foreign currency at a time of declining 
profitability and were betting on currency stability. In turn, the crisis was greatly exacerbated by 
these bets.  
Aguiar (2002), Pratap, Lobato and Somuano (2003), and Martinez and Werner (2002) 
focus on the Mexican experience and find that Mexican firms tend to partially hedge the 
currency composition of their liabilities. However, Aguiar provides prima facie evidence that 
firms are not fully hedged by showing that the currency depreciation during the Tequila crisis led 
to a reduction of net worth with a consequent drop in investment. Martinez and Werner find 
weak evidence of hedging before the Tequila crisis, but they suggest that the flexible exchange 
rate system adopted by Mexico in the aftermath of the crisis increased the incentives for hedging 
and hence reduced mismatches in firms’ balance sheets.
7   
In short, firm-level evidence suggests good rationales for financial dollarization to be a 
cause of policy concern, especially in countries with fairly underdeveloped derivatives 
markets, as most are in the Latin American region (see Table 4).  Currency derivatives are 
shallow markets, leaving exports as the main alternative to hedge dollar-denominated 
obligations. Balance sheet effects at the firm level can have adverse effects on investment and 
growth directly, as well as by increasing overall financial sector fragility even in countries in 
which domestic financial sector loans are not dollarized. In such cases, firms indebted abroad can 
default not only on their foreign but also on their domestic obligations, hurting the local financial 
system as well. 
Several concerns about the vulnerability of the financial system emerge with 
dollarization. While empirical evidence suggests that dollarization can reduce the adverse effect 
of high inflation on financial intermediation,
8 there are many valid concerns with respect to its 
impact on financial fragility. Dollarized financial systems are particularly subject to solvency 
and liquidity risks. The main source of fragility arises from currency mismatches in the event of 
large exchange rate depreciations. While regulations have limited significantly the extent to 
which banks can have currency mismatches in their balance sheets, the indirect effects of 
                                                       
7 This evidence is supportive of models that emphasize the moral hazard role of fixed exchange rate regimes; see, 
for instance, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999). 
8 See De Nicoló, Honahan and Ize (2003). 
13  portfolio deterioration remain. In a way, the currency mismatch is transferred to borrowers, but 
the financial institution still bears the currency mismatch risk, especially if the borrower is 
unhedged.
9 As noted by De Nicoló, Honohan and Ize(2003), this form of credit risk may be 
associated with an increased risk of deposit withdrawals that can lead to bank runs in response to 
or in anticipation of a devaluation.  
In summary, the foregoing empirical evidence surveyed suggests that from the 
perspective of firm performance and the health of the financial sector there are good reasons for 
caring about dollarization. 
   Public debt dynamics can be another source of concern about dollarization.  Just imagine 
an economy facing an adverse shock such as a sudden stop in capital inflows—e.g., giving rise to 
a domestic currency depreciation together with a slowdown in economic activity and in tax 
revenues—in the presence of a high share of total public debt issued in foreign currency terms.  
Clearly, the almost built-in rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio can be accompanied by a set of 
perverse debt dynamics.  In fact, Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002) show that the dollarization of 
public debt played a significant role in explaining the Argentine crash. Dollarized public sectors 
are exposed to the same problems as non-tradable firms indebted in foreign currency. In the case 
of Argentina the authors argue that the country was fiscally weak, not because of the size of its 
fiscal deficit, but mostly because of the composition of its debt. Given its high level of 
dollarization, the fluctuation in the real exchange rate that accompanied the sudden stop in 
capital flows turned an apparently sustainable fiscal situation into an unsustainable one.  
We now turn to a discussion of how to deal with the foregoing concerns about 
dollarization. 
 
4. Living  with  Dollarization 
 
Coping with the risks of dollarization can become a high-priority policy objective. While some 
countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela have tried to avoid domestic 
financial dollarization by banning or highly restricting the possibility of issuing deposits in 
foreign currency, most countries have allowed for currency diversification within the domestic 
financial sector. Note that despite the fact that currency diversification is restricted in Brazil, 
                                                       
9 De Nicoló, Honohan and Ize (2003) show empirical results suggesting that highly dollarized economies are more 
prone to solvency problems and increase deposit volatility.  
14  Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, residents have diversified via offshore accounts (Table 5). 
The figures reported in Table 5 underestimate the size of offshore accounts, given that they do 
not include deposits in non-BIS reporting banks. Deposits in fiscal or tax “paradises” can be 
substantial. However, despite this limitation of the data, it is remarkable how the share of 
deposits abroad to some extent can substitute onshore dollar deposits. While, at least to our 
knowledge, there is no systematic study on the impact of offshore deposits on financial 
development, it is likely that, to some extent, allowing some currency diversification onshore 
might lead to some expansion of credit. This, though, remains to be tested. 
The most interesting question is how countries that allow domestic financial 
intermediation in foreign currency deal with the potential risks described above. The surprising 
answer, as reported in Table 6, is that in very few cases prudential regulation directly 
addresses risks related to dollarization.
10 
While in all countries regulation imposes restrictions on the direct exchange rate risk 
exposure in the balance sheet of financial institutions, it does not deal with the possible 
deleterious effects of borrowers’ dollarization on the quality of loans. Only in Costa Rica, 
according to our survey, are the authorities studying the possibility of assigning specific 
provisions to dollar-denominated loans. In Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay 
banks are encouraged to incorporate exchange rate risk in the valuation of credit risk; however, 
there are no systematic guidelines for doing so and no specific criteria to attach specific 
provisions to these risks. Because in most countries provisioning rules are determined based on 
accruals rather than forward-looking criteria, there is no systematic way of dealing with 
borrowers’ currency mismatches and reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on banking 
stability.  
While the adoption of Basel II, IRB types of regulations could ease the current lack of 
direct prudential action with respect to currency mismatches, it is unlikely that the use of internal 
credit risk assessment models will be generalized throughout the region. Given the lack of data in 
some countries and questionable technical quality at some banks and banking superintendencies, 
we believe it is not likely that in the near future most banks will have the methods and 
mechanisms to adequately assess such risks individually. Given that, and the need to develop a 
                                                       
10 Information reported in Table 5 is based on our survey of Latin American policy makers. We surveyed 
policymakers in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela 
15  prudential framework that deals with the risks of domestic dollarization, the introduction of 
tighter prudential requirements on foreign currency loans in the form of specific rules, such 
as ceilings on certain exposures, or general provisions on foreign currency loans could be 
considered. In more sophisticated markets, or at least for more sophisticated banks, such as 
developed country origin foreign banks that operate in the region, the use of internal credit risk 
models could be allowed, as long as the domestic regulators are certain that they effectively deal 
with the currency mismatch problem. 
With respect to liquidity risk, the most dollarized countries have tried to deal with it by 
imposing higher reserve requirements on dollar-denominated liabilities. In this sense, regulation 
has been aimed at letting banks bear the full risk and cost of assuming dollar-denominated 
liabilities.  
   In Bolivia, for example, differential reserve requirements have been in place for a long 
time. Virtually no fixed-term deposit in domestic currency or in inflation-indexed units with 
maturity lower than 720 days has a reserve requirement. All deposits in foreign currency have a 
10 percent reserve requirement, except those with maturities greater than 720 days. Demand 
deposits in either currency have a 10 percent requirement.   
The Peruvian case is similar. In order to reduce liquidity risk, maintaining relatively high 
levels of reserves is a policy objective. As in Bolivia, differential reserve requirements between 
foreign currency and domestic currency deposits are applied. On average, domestic currency 
deposits have an 8 percent requirement, while foreign currency deposits have a 20 percent 
requirement. These rates have been effective since 1998; however, differential requirements have 
been in place since the 1980s. 
As in Bolivia and Peru, Paraguay has adopted differential reserve requirements. It is 
notable, however, that aside from this measure, very little has been done in Paraguay to deal with 
the financial vulnerabilities associated with dollarization.  
 
5.  The Route to Dedollarization 
 
Dedollarizing an economy can be a very difficult and very costly task. It is usually the side 
effect, or endogenous outcome, of a persistent process of disinflation and stabilization rather than 
the main objective of a policy program. In fact very few countries in the globe have been able to 
16  do so. This is true both from the perspective of dedollarizing the financial sector as well as 
dedollarizing public sector debt. 
 
Financial Sector Dedollarization 
 
In order to identify successful experiences of dedollarization of the financial sector, we construct 
a database for over 90 countries around the world on dollarization of financial sector deposits 
and loans.
11 Based on this data we explore which countries have successfully dedollarized their 
financial systems. We define dedollarization as: i) having initial high dollarization (over 40 
percent of deposits or loans), ii) reducing dollarization to 20 percent or less and iii) maintaining 
those levels for at least five consecutive years. Using these criteria we identify only three 
countries as successful dedollarizers: Chile, Israel and Poland (figure 5). 
   Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) note that for the sample of countries for which 
they had data available (85 countries), only four have been able to dedollarize their financial 
system successfully: Israel, Mexico, Poland and Pakistan. They define dedollarization as a case 
in which deposit dollarization falls by 20 percent, then settles at a level below 20 percent and 
remains below that level. Mexico does not fit our criteria, given that the initial level of 
dollarization was low; the share of dollar deposits only reached 25 percent at the beginning of the 
1980s. The shares in the other three countries were well above 40 percent.  
   We will discuss Israel in detail in the following section. The case of Chile is amply 
analyzed in Herrera and Valdés (2003), and hence will not be analyzed here. However, it is 
worth noting that Chile is an interesting case of dedollarization. While the share of dollar-
denominated deposits in Chile never exceeded any worrisome level, the share of dollar-
denominated loans averaged 45 percent at the beginning of the 1980s and was reduced to less 
than 10 percent by the end of the 1990s. While in Chile and Israel dedollarization has been a 
long process, other countries have tried to adopt faster ways to dedollarize. Pakistan is one such 
case. In 1998 deposits were forced to be converted to domestic currency. The same happened in 
Argentina in 2001. While these experiences are fairly recent and hence difficult to evaluate, there 
are other experiences in Latin America that suggest this is not necessarily an optimal strategy. 
                                                       
11 Our principal sources of data are Arteta (2003) and Honohan and Shi (2003), which we complement with 
information from Latin American countries’ bank superintendencies. 
17  The cases of Bolivia and Peru, once again, are clear examples of unsuccessful currency 
conversions of deposits.  
   In 1982 Bolivian authorities attempted to “dedollarize” the economy by converting 
dollar-denominated financial instruments to pesos bolivianos at an exchange rate below the 
prevailing one in the market. Capital controls, price controls, and interest rate caps were also 
imposed at the time. Real negative interest rates prevailed in Bolivia during the high-inflation 
period of the early 1980s. In response to this high inflation and the prohibition of holding dollar-
denominated deposits on shore, offshore deposits grew significantly, and financial intermediation 
declined sharply. In 1985, when the stabilization package aimed at targeting the fiscal deficit and 
increasing monetary policy independence was adopted, the ban on foreign currency deposits was 
also lifted. Inflation and the fiscal deficit were successfully reduced and financial intermediation 
resumed as financial dollarization grew. 
     The Peruvian case is similar. In an attempt to reduce dollarization, dollar deposits were 
converted in 1985 into domestic currency deposits. However, due to the negative impact of this 
policy on financial intermediation, two years later deposits in foreign currency were once again 
allowed. By the end of the decade foreign currency deposits represented nearly 60 percent of 
total deposits.  
   In both cases the combination of persistent high inflation and a ban on foreign currency 
deposits were a sharp hit to financial intermediation. In order to regain some financial depth, 
redollarization was allowed.  
 
Public Debt Dedollarization in Latin America 
 
Reversing high levels of dollarization in the financial system is a long-term process. As 
discussed previously, not many countries have been successful in doing so. There are, however, a 
few experiences in Latin America where public debt dollarization has been partially reverted. 
The most notable is perhaps the Mexican case. As noted in Figure 6, the composition of debt in 
Mexico has changed dramatically since the mid-1990s. External dollar-denominated debt 
accounted for more than 80 percent of total indebtedness in 1995 while it represented less than 
50 percent of total debt in 2002. Budgetary needs are funded entirely in local markets. While 
debt management strategies have been important in explaining this pattern of debt composition, 
18  underlying fundamentals have been the most critical aspect in generating domestic currency debt 
markets.  
    Mexico has reduced its vulnerability to international capital markets crises substantially 
in the past years by reducing its share of dollar-denominated public debt. This has been the result 
of strong and consistent fiscal consolidation accompanied by a prudent monetary policy. The 
fiscal deficit has been decreasing, and the central bank has kept inflation within its target. In 
addition, the integration of Mexico with the US and Canada has increased the country’s growth 
potential. In response, the ratio of debt to GDP has reached its lowest level in the past 30 years, 
and interest rates have achieved historical lows.  
    The Mexican government has been very actively promoting the development of long-
term domestic local currency debt markets. In fact, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 6 the share of 
fixed rate debt has been rising since 2000 reaching 16 percent of internal debt in 2001. With the 
achievement of macroeconomic stability, the share of fixed rate debt in total internal debt has 
risen. The government strategy in this respect has been to start issuing fixed-rate debt with 3, 5 
and 10-year maturities gradually. This way, not only is interest rate risk reduced, but also a yield 
curve that can help develop other financial instruments is being set. The government expects the 
establishment of a yield curve to foster the development of long-term private markets as well as a 
liquid derivatives market. Given that long-term markets are not deep enough yet, the strategy to 
move towards fixed long-term debt has been a slow process. As markets become deeper, 
authorities are expecting to decrease the share of floating term debt. Again, the main strategy to 
increase the breadth of these markets is to maintain sound fiscal and monetary policies aimed at 
promoting stability.  
    Inflation-indexed securities have been developed as well. However, given price stability, 
the share of such instruments is not particularly large. Demand for such debt has come mainly 
from pension funds and insurance companies.  
    Regulation has played an important role in explaining the shift in currency composition. 
The issuance of external debt has been constrained by a yearly ceiling imposed in the budget by 
Congress. In addition, Congress has approved an active strategy to reduce foreign indebtedness 
during the 2001-2003 period. Part of the current strategy includes raising the average maturity of 
foreign debt, increasing the scope of investors, anticipating debt amortizations, and repurchasing 
debt, among others. 
19      Few other countries in Latin America have been able to follow Mexico’s path. Probably 
one of the most interesting cases in which the composition of debt has changed is that of Brazil. 
However, and as opposed to Mexico, this has not represented significant currency shifts, nor has 
it been accompanied by a significant reduction in overall indebtedness. What is most significant 
is a shift from external to internal debt; however, within internal debt foreign currency indexed 
debt has gained participation. 
    Due to recent political uncertainty and an increase in international capital market risk 
perceptions,
12 the overall level of indebtedness has increased and the current composition of debt 
is such that the country's fiscal accounts are highly exposed to short-term interest rate 
fluctuations. Following the launch of the real plan in 1994, the share of fixed-rate debt increased 
significantly. However, this rise turned out to be unsustainable as emerging markets faced 
turbulence after the sudden stop in capital flows that followed the Russian crisis in 1998.  As a 
result, the stock of fixed-rate debt has fallen significantly and the share of foreign exchange 
linked internal debt and debt indexed to the SELIC rate have risen. Overall, as shown in panel b 
of Figure 7, despite the reduction in external debt, dollarization of total public debt has not 
changed substantially.  
  Like  Brazil,  other  countries in the region have increased the depth of local public debt 
markets. However, many of them are currently facing deep sustainability problems linked to the 
fact that the increase in the share of domestic debt markets did not represent an overall reduction 
in the size of public dollar indebtedness, but rather was the result of finding needs to access 
additional funding for expenditure hikes. While the fiscal situation is not resolved, it is difficult 
to assess if these have in fact been successful cases of public debt dedollarization. 
 
Current Policies to Dedollarize in Latin America 
 
Our survey conducted with policymakers in Latin American countries reveals that in highly 
dollarized countries there is currently no policy initiative aimed at directly reducing the levels of 
financial dollarization. Policy is aimed towards developing capital markets in domestic currency 
or in indexed units in such a way that dollarization can be reduced at a time when sound 
monetary and fiscal policies gain credibility.  Table 7 reports some of the answers of 
policymakers of highly dollarized economies to questions on the survey. 
                                                       
12 See Calvo and Talvi (2002) for a discussion. 
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CPI Indexation of Financial Instruments as a Substitute for Dollarization 
 
It is interesting to note that in the cases of Bolivia and Uruguay there is an active policy to 
reduce public sector dollarization through the development of CPI-indexed debt instruments. In 
addition, this option is currently under study in Costa Rica. Our survey of policymakers’ views 
suggests that in this sense they seem to prefer CPI indexation to dollarization. Except for Chile, 
and to a lesser extent Colombia, CPI indexation in Latin America is relatively low, as shown in 
Table 8.  Countries like Peru have considered the option, but have preferred to focus on 
developing nominal bonds rather than CPI-indexed bonds. According to our survey of Central 
Banks (Table 9), the main problems faced by Latin American countries with the issuance of CPI-
indexed instruments are the instability of inflation, real exchange rate depreciation, the lack of 
development of secondary markets, and the potential balance sheet effects that can arise when 
only financial sector assets, but not liabilities, are indexed.  
   Latin American countries have had multiple experiences with CPI indexation in the past. 
The most successful case, which will not be reviewed here in detail, is the Chilean one.
13  
Indexation of financial contracts, both at the public and private sector levels, became widely used 
since the 1970s. The key to the success of the Chilean experience has been the credibility that 
index itself has developed as well as the credibility of monetary and fiscal policies. CPI 
indexation rules have not changed since the adoption of the UF (unidad de fomento, a–CPI- 
indexed unit). Moreover, the UF has grown in a context of low inflation and a credible fiscal and 
monetary stance. Once the financial crisis was resolved in the early 1980s, domestic financial 
intermediation grew consistently in a stable macroeconomic environment. The rise of long-term 
institutional investors, plus the commitment of authorities to an indexation rule, allowed CPI-
indexed financial markets to develop rapidly. Currently, and despite the fact that regulation 
allows Chilean banks to issue dollar-denominated deposits, confidence in macroeconomic policy 
and in the UF has kept financial dollarization at high levels. Nearly 40 percent of deposits in the 
financial sector, and 55 percent of loans are in CPI-indexed units. 
   The successful experience of Chile, however, has not been replicated in other countries. 
Colombia, for example, was another country where CPI-indexed financial instruments gained 
great importance. In the early 1970s, financial intermediaries started using CPI indexation 
                                                       
13 See Herrera and Valdés for a very complete analysis of CPI indexation in Chile.  
21  aggressively to develop long-term housing credit.  While long-term loans in CPI-indexed units 
(UPAC) grew significantly during the 1970s and 1980s, deposits remained at a very short 
maturity. The lack of long-term institutional investors limited the possibility of matching 
maturities for Colombian financial intermediaries. Fluctuations in the real exchange rate led to 
liquidity effects at the financial intermediary level that forced the Central Bank to provide 
liquidity frequently in a way altering the conduct of monetary policy. When the Central Bank 
needed to push up interest rates, financial intermediaries would experience a rise in the cost of 
liabilities (interest rate denominated short-term liabilities) vis-à-vis the return on assets (CPI-
indexed long-term assets). The resulting negative liquidity effect forced the central bank to 
supply liquidity to these intermediaries and hence revert the initial decision to increase the 
interest rate, in order to avoid financial stress. To combat this, the policy response was to change 
the formula used to calculate the variation of the UPAC. In fact, between 1972 and 1994 the 
formula was changed 19 times in order to avoid the negative liquidity effects described above. In 
1994 authorities decided to eliminate CPI variations from the UPAC, and linked it entirely to 
interest rate fluctuations. In 1998, and following the sudden stop in international capital flows, 
the currency came under attack and the Central Bank initially defended it by increasing interest 
rates. The result was a huge increase in non-performing UPAC-indexed loans, a collapse of 
mortgage credit and a costly financial crisis.  
   The lack of long-term demand for CPI-indexed financial instruments, as well as low 
credibility associated with frequent changes in the indexation rule severely limited the behavior 
of financial indexation in Colombia. Recently a new attempt to reuse financial indexation has 
been made. This time, pension funds have become a greater player in the attempt to develop CPI-
indexed financial markets.
14 
   Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay also have had repeated experiences with CPI-indexed 
financial instruments. In Jiménez (1993) the major difficulties with the development of CPI 
indexation in these countries are analyzed.  He concludes that the lack of development of these 
instruments in the late 1980s and early 1990s was associated with inexistent demand for long-
term indexed assets, difficulty agreeing on a common indexation measure (demanders and 
suppliers of financial instruments are affected by different prices), lack of legal protection of the 
                                                       
14 See Cárdenas and Badel (2003) and Lora and Sanchez (1993) for details on the Colombian experience with CPI 
indexation. 
22  indexation unit (in many cases the indexation unit was challenged in court, in others the 
indexation unit was not defined in any law), uncertainty about possible changes in the indexation 
unit, a significant lag between the realization of inflation and the moment the fluctuation affects 
the unit (2 or 3 months), and a preference toward foreign assets in foreign currency vis-à-vis 
domestic assets.
15   
   While we believe that developing CPI-indexed domestic financial instruments could be a 
useful policy avenue at a time of high and volatile inflation and constraints to capital mobility, 
that is not the case at the present time. For many countries, inflation has become low and stable, 
and there has been a considerable opening up of the capital account.  The current trend in 
countries such as Chile and Peru is to develop and deepen a market in domestic nominal (non-
indexed) financial assets, much as it exists in advanced economies.  From this perspective, it 
might be a sounder strategy to dedollarize by helping develop these markets rather than by taking 
the  “intermediate” step of shifting to CPI indexation.  Yet, one would need to see the full 
analytics and economic tradeoffs associated with these various strategies before one could reach 
normative conclusions on this issue.     
 
6.  Lessons from Israel’s Dedollarization for Latin America 
 
Exploring the main features of Israel’s  “successful” dedollarization is highly relevant for Latin 
American economies for a variety of reasons.  First, this country’s gradual process of disinflation 
and stabilization—which brought the rate of inflation down from about 400 percent per year in 
1984 to single digits in the late 1990s (see Leiderman, 1999)—has many elements in common 
with those seen in various Latin American countries.  Second, as shown by the composite 
dollarization index developed by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Israel’s level and 
structure of dollarization is very similar to that of leading Latin American economies such as 
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, as is the widespread existence of indexation to the movements in the 
price level.  Third, as in Latin America, there has been no comprehensive policy plan directly 
attempting to dedollarize the economy.  Instead, dedollarization has been the side effect, or 
endogenous outcome, of persistent stabilization and disinflation.  This has been coupled with a 
relatively active policy of changing the composition of public sector deficit finance toward 
                                                       
15 Canavese (1993) and Rama and Forteza (2003) describe this in detail for the Argentine and Uruguayan cases, 
respectively. 
23  nominal, local currency assets and with the introduction of foreign-exchange risk hedging 
instruments such as derivatives. 
   The evidence of deposits dedollarization is depicted in Figure 8.  Perhaps the most direct 
way to summarize this evidence is to indicate how impressive has been the rise in the share of 
local-currency denominated bank deposits in total deposits, from 3 percent in 1984—the year of 
highest inflation—to 38 percent nowadays.  Dollar-denominated deposits accounted for 39 
percent of total deposits in 1984, and their share of the total decreased to 17 percent in 2002.  
Less impressive, though, has been the decrease in CPI-indexed deposits, from 58 percent of the 
total in 1984 to 45 percent in 2002. 
   That the phenomenon of indexation or dollarization can be stubborn or inertial is also 
illustrated by Figure 8.  Although Israel has enjoyed more than half a decade of very low, single-
digit, inflation rates in the context of a properly operating inflation targeting regime, and in spite 
of major steps toward fiscal consolidation over that time period, the majority of bank deposits are 
still held in some form of indexed deposits, be it to the CPI or in dollarized form.  Thus, there 
seems to be a ratchet effect in the process of indexation and/or dollarization.  This process 
seems to develop rapidly when inflation accelerates to relatively high levels, but it does not 
immediately disappear once inflation has been brought down.  Clearly, one possible 
explanation for this asymmetry has to do with the fact that disinflation—if and when effected—is 
not perceived as a fully credible and persistent development by the public.  It is only with time, 
and if low inflation and a stable macro environment are maintained, that there is a chance of 
seeing some marked decrease in the degree of indexation or dollarization.  It is in this sense that 
economies remain  “addicted to dollars,” to use an expression coined by Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003), in spite of the disappearance of those factors that initially led to the 
dollarization phenomenon. 
   Although there was no direct policy attempt to dedollarize the economy, a most active 
policy in this direction was conducted in the setting of the composition of public sector 
issuance (see Figure 9).  A conscious effort was made to deepen the market for local-currency 
denominated bonds.  In fact, while in 1985 no such bonds were being issued as part of public 
sector deficit finance, and all the bonds issued were either indexed to the CPI or in foreign-
currency terms, most of the current deficit financing needs are met through issuance of local 
currency nominal bonds.   
24     While it is reasonable to ask what has been the fiscal cost associated with this strategy, 
getting a quantitative answer is not easy.  The main reason is that precisely when this debt  
“nominalization” was being effected, Israel was going through a disinflation episode—shifting 
from double-digit to single-digit inflation rates—which, as expected, resulted in relatively high 
ex-ante (and ex-post) real interest rates (see Leiderman, 1999).  In particular, while the average 
yearly real rate of return on indexed bonds for the period from 1995 to the present was 4.8 
percent, nominal bonds yielded an average yearly real return of 8.8 percent.  A priori, it is 
difficult to disentangle which part of the nominal bonds  “premium” reflected risk factors 
associated with the  “new” asset and which part had to do with the disinflation process per se.  
We believe it is reasonable to posit that for a country that has already reached relatively low and 
stable inflation (as have a few economies in Latin America), the cost associated with developing 
domestic nominal assets instead of dollar-denominated or CPI-indexed ones would be lower than 
for a country that is in the midst of a disinflation process. 
   Israel’s policy activism in developing a market for domestic nominal assets also showed 
up in the growing lengthening of the maturity of domestic nominal bonds issued by the 
treasury.  Back in 1995—the first year in which 2-year nominal bonds were introduced—all of 
the nominal bonds had this longest maturity.  Yet, Figure 10 shows that over time the 
government increased issuing longer paper, which now has a longest maturity of 10 years.  In 
fact, 90 percent of public sector bonds issued in 2002 were done in the form of nominal bonds 
with maturities above 5 years.  The same development can be seen in Figure 11, which shows 
how the average maturity of nominal bonds has increased from 2 years in 1995 to 6.5 years in 
2002.  No doubt, for an observer of the Israeli economy at the beginning of the 1990s it 
would have seemed unimaginable that 10-year nominal bonds would be so widely held in 
Israel by the end of that decade! 
   The high liquidity of these government issued nominal bonds can be appreciated in figure 
12, which shows that they were the most popular traded asset on the Tel-Aviv Securities 
Exchange, over and above stocks and indexed bonds. 
   It is fair to characterize as quite low the degree of dollarization-induced vulnerability of 
the Israeli banking system to adverse shocks.  First, the banks’ supervision authority plays an 
active role in ensuring that banks maintain covered positions in their foreign exchange activities.  
Accordingly, there is no sizeable gap between their foreign-currency denominated assets and 
25  liabilities.  As far as dollarized credit is concerned, its current share of total banking credit is 37 
percent and has remained at similar levels in recent years.  About 24 percent of total banking 
credit is indexed to the CPI, while 39 percent of the total is denominated in domestic-currency 
non-indexed terms.  The large share of foreign-currency denominated credit in part reflects the 
openness of the economy, with a relatively large sector of importers and exporters.  Private 
banks attempt to make sure that these agents maintain covered credit positions, which is not 
difficult given the nature of their international business.  For borrowers whose activities do not 
directly deal with foreign exchange, banks are typically asked to require active hedging of the 
currency risks or a more rigid set of collateral requirements on loans.  As a matter of fact, the 
central bank has played a very active role in promoting markets in financial derivatives, and in 
particular those instruments designed to deal with exchange rate risk.  In fact, the growth in 
trading volumes in foreign-exchange derivatives has been enormous.  The annual volume surged 
from US$ 5.5 billion (i.e., 5.7 percent of GDP) in 1996 to US$ 130 billion in 2003 (which 
amounts to 117 percent of GDP).  While the Bank of Israel had a leading role in initiating this 
market, right now the vast majority of the trading is done within the private financial sector 
alone. 
   In summary, the evidence from Israel is quite in line with what in our view can be 
expected to happen in a typical partially dollarized Latin American economy during the 
remainder of this decade.  First, the persistence of low and stable inflation, on the backdrop of 
fiscal consolidation, gave rise to an endogenous, and rather slow process of dedollarization.  That 
is, the latter was more a byproduct of stabilization rather than an outcome of a policy program 
with that explicit aim.  Dedollarization has been stronger on the deposits side than on the liability 
side.  Second, as inflation subsided the authorities increasingly relied on nominal local-currency 
bonds issuance as a way to finance the budget deficit.  Over time, the maturity of these bonds has 
been increased, and the longest (and highly liquid) maturity is now 10 years.  Third, banking 
supervision assumed a key role in ensuring that commercial banks had fully covered foreign-
currency positions; with assets equaling liabilities in that denomination.  In addition, general 
guidelines were provided to ensure that those borrowing in foreign-currency credit mainly 
belong to the international trade sector or have properly hedged their currency risks.  Although 
this process of dedollarization has evolved in a gradual way, there is no doubt in our minds that it 
26  has produced a major fall in the degree of dollarization-induced vulnerability faced by the 




Our survey and research delivers six main conclusions.  First, Latin American economies have 
shown thus far a strong degree of financial dollarization persistence.  In spite of major 
disinflation and a shift toward sound policy fundamentals, dollarization has remained very high.  
Second, although the authorities in the region have become increasingly aware that high 
dollarization carries considerable risks and can exacerbate a typical Latin American economy’s 
vulnerability to adverse shocks (e.g. sudden stops), there are no current direct policy initiatives to 
reduce the level of dollarization.  The latter is seen more as a side effect of sound policies and 
fundamentals than as a policy objective.  Third, key among all economic risks or concerns about 
high financial dollarization is the perverse debt dynamic that can arise in response to adverse 
shocks in economies with a high degree of public and private sector dollarized indebtedness and 
where derivatives markets (e.g., for hedging currency risks) remain underdeveloped.  Fourth, we 
found that in only a very few cases does prudential regulation directly address the foregoing key 
risks.  It is in this context that we believe tighter prudential requirements on foreign-currency 
loans as well as enhanced local markets in financial derivatives should be considered.  Fifth, 
although policymakers in some countries are currently considering a shift to CPI-indexed 
financial instruments as a means of attenuating the degree of dollarization, the existence of sound 
fundamentals and of low and stable inflation in many countries allows them to consider instead a 
shift to domestic nominal financial assets, similar to those which prevail in advanced economies.  
Sixth, as Israel’s experience (which is similar to the Chilean case) suggests, even if there is no 
direct policy initiative aimed at dedollarizing the financial system, when sound fundamentals are 
in place the authorities can play an active role in developing a market in domestic nominal assets 
such as government bonds, and in lengthening the maturity of these assets over time.  Israel’s 
experience is also useful in illustrating how banking supervision enacted various measures aimed 
at ensuring proper coverage of banks’ foreign-currency positions and at developing various 
domestic financial derivative instruments. 
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31  Appendix - Survey of Central Banks 
 
1.  Does banking regulation restrict banks from taking deposits in dollars or other foreign 
currency? If so, please explain the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is 
this regulation in place? What motivated it? 
 
a.  What is the share of deposits in foreign currency in the banking system? If possible, 
please provide a time series for this variable.  
 
2.  Does regulation restrict banks from issuing other liabilities in foreign currency?  If so, 
please explain the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is this regulation 
in place? What motivated it? 
 
a.  What is the share of other liabilities in foreign currency in the banking system? If 
possible, please provide a time series of this variable.  
 
3.  Does regulation impose restrictions on banks to offer guarantees on loans in foreign 
currency taken by their clients, in order to avoid contingent liabilities in foreign currency? If so, 
please explain the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is this regulation 
in place? What motivated it? 
 
4.  Does regulation restrict banks from lending in foreign currency? If so, please explain the 




a.  What is the share of foreign currency loans with respect to total loans in the banking 
system? If possible, please provide a time series of this variable.  
 
32  5.  Does regulation restrict banks from holding other assets denominated in foreign 
currency? If so, please explain the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is 
this regulation in place? What motivated it? 
 
a.  What is the share of foreign currency claims (excluding foreign currency loans) with 
respect to total claims (excluding loans) in the banking system? If possible, please provide a time 
series of this variable.  
 
6.  Does regulation restrict currency mismatches in banks? If so, please explain the 
regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is this regulation in place? What 
motivated it? 
 
7.  If a bank does not have a currency mismatch in its balance sheet, but lends in foreign 
currency, the mismatch can be transferred to the borrower increasing his credit risk (when the 
borrower's income is in domestic currency). For example, when the borrower’s primary activity 
is in the non-tradable sector taking a loan in dollars generates a currency risk that can affect his 
ability to repay his loan. Does regulation deal with this type of mismatch?  If so, please explain 
the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is this regulation in place? What 
motivated it? 
 
8.  Do regulatory and supervisory practices require banks to monitor and verify the 
borrower’s cash flow? If so, please explain the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. 
Since when is this regulation in place? What motivated it? 
 
9.  Do banks in your country use internal risk models? (For example models that allow banks 
to perform stress tests under different exchange rate or other relevant variable scenarios?) Does 
regulation require banks to use these models? If so, please explain the regulation in detail or 
attach it to your answers. Since when is this regulation in place? What motivated it? 
 
33  10.  Is some type of regulatory incentive for banks to use hedging instruments in place? If so, 
please explain the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is this regulation 
in place? What motivated it? 
 
11.  Are there ways to verify mismatches in off balance sheet operations? If so, please explain 
the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is this regulation in place? What 
motivated it? 
 
12.  Are there specific regulations that deal with off shore exposure of banks? If so, please 
explain the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since when is this regulation in 
place? What motivated it? 
 
13.  Does prudential regulation treat assets in foreign and domestic currency in different ways 
(for example different provisions or different capital requirements)? Please explain. 
  
a.  If there are differences, since when are they in place? 
  
14.  Does your country have deposit insurance? If so: 
 
a.  Is the coverage partial or total? If partial, what is the coverage? 
b.  Is there any difference in the coverage of deposits in foreign and domestic currencies?  
i.  If there are differences, since when are they in place? Please explain.  
 
15.  Is the use of inflation indexed financial instruments a common practice?  
a.  If used by the banking system: 
i.  What is the share of loans and deposits of the banking system in these instruments? 
ii.  Since when are they being used? 
iii.  If possible, please explain what led to the creation and use of these instruments, and 
explain the role of any government agency in such process. 
iv.  What do you believe are the major obstacles to developing or deepening the market for 
these instruments in your country?  
34  v.  Do you know of any failed attempt implementing these types of instruments in your 
country? Please describe them and document them to the best of your ability.  
vi.  Please describe the precise characteristics of these instruments (indicator to which they 
are indexed, lag, etc.). 
 
b.  If used by the public sector (bonds):  
i.  What is the share of public debt in these instruments? 
ii.  Since when are they being used? 
iii.  If possible, please explain what led to the creation and use of these instruments, and 
explain the role of any government agency in such process. 
iv.  What do you believe are the major obstacles to developing or deepening the market for 
these instruments in your country?  
v.  Do you know of any failed attempt implementing these types of instruments in your 
country? Please describe them and document them to the best of your ability.   
vi.  Please describe the precise characteristics of these instruments (indicator to which they 
are indexed, lag, etc.). 
 
 
16.  If your country has private pension funds:  
a.  What restrictions on holding currency assets are imposed by regulation? 
b.  What restrictions on holdings of indexed financial instruments are imposed by 
regulation? 
c.  Is there any regulatory incentive for pension funds to hold domestic currency or inflation 
indexed assets? If so, please explain the regulation in detail or attach it to your answers. Since 
when is this regulation in place? What motivated it? 
 
17.  In what currency or unit of account are the following prices denominated? 
a.  Housing / other real estate 
b. Vehicles 
c. Home  Rentals 
d. Public  utilities 
35  e.  Cellular phone charges 
f. Wages 
g.  Is there any other good/service which price is indexed to any specific measure including 
the exchange rate?  
 
18.  In what currency do the following transactions take place? 
a.  Housing / other real estate 
b. Vehicles 
c. Home  Rentals 
d. Public  utilities 
e.  Cellular phone charges 
f. Wages 
g.  Is there any other good/service in which transactions take place in other currency 
different to domestic currency?  
 
19.  If changes in the way that the prices mentioned above are indexed (including dollar 
indexation) have taken place, please indicate the moment in which they took place and what led 
to these changes.  
 
20.  If your country has a high degree of financial dollarization (by financial dollarization we 
mean that residents hold assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency):  
 
a.  Do you know of any initiative aimed at reducing it? If so: 
 
i.  What were (are) its main components? 
ii.  Do you consider that these initiatives were (have been) successful? Please explain. 
iii.  What were (have been) the major difficulties that limited the success of the strategy? 
  
b. If  not: 
 
i.  Are authorities satisfied with the current degree of financial dollarization? 
36  ii.  Do authorities have some position with respect to the optimal degree of financial 
dollarization? 
iii.  Does the current level of financial dollarization affect monetary and fiscal policies in any 
way? Please discuss. 
iv.  Has any strategy to reduce financial dollarization been considered? Please discuss. 
v.  Have regulations intending to deal with dollarization been considered or imposed? Please 
describe and discuss. 
 
21.  If there is no financial dollarization in your country: 
  
a.  In your opinion, why hasn’t it occurred?   
b.  Is this an optimal situation, or do you think that a greater degree of financial dollarization 
is desirable?  
c.  What do you think have been the disadvantages of not having financial dollarization? Are 
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ARGENTINA  14 20  96 
BOLIVIA  92 96  95 
BRAZIL  0 0 49 
CHILE  15 14  45 
COLOMBIA  1 5 59 
COSTA RICA  46 55  53 
GUATEMALA  10 25  88 
HONDURAS  34 26  95 
MEXICO  10 32  42 
NICARAGUA  71 84  98 
PARAGUAY  64 57 NA 
PERU  74 79  92 
URUGUAY  85 61  96 
VENEZUELA  0 1 67 
Average LAC  37  40  75 
Average other emerging 
c 22  19  39 
Notes: 
a US$ deposits/total deposits and US$ loans/total loans in the domestic financial system. Data for 
1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Source: Arteta (2003), Honohan (2003) and Bank Superintendencies.  
b 
US$ debt/total public sector debt. Data for 2001 and 2002. Source: Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía(2003) 
and Central Banks and Finance Ministries. 
c Includes: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, 
Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Thailand and 
Turkey. 
 
  38Table 2. Inflation and GDP Growth in Latin America (in percent) 
 
  Inflation GDP Growth
Country  76-85  86-95 96-02 76-85  86-95 96-02
Average  Std. Dev.  Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Brazil  151.1  56.0  1,083.7 976.6 7.6 4.0 4.4 4.9  3.0 2.6 2.6 1.8
Venezuela  11.1  4.7  41.9 20.9 37.2 30.4 1.6 4.1  3.4 5.2 1.0 4.2
Colombia  23.4  5.1  25.0 3.7 13.1 5.8 3.7 2.1  4.5 1.2 1.1 2.5
Guatemala  9.5  5.3  18.7 12.9 7.7 2.1 2.3 4.0  3.6 1.3 3.5 1.0
Chile  81.2  60.4  16.8 5.4 4.5 1.7 1.8 6.9  7.7 2.7 3.7 2.7
Mexico  39.4  28.1  46.9 46.1 15.5 10.1 4.5 4.3  1.7 3.7 4.0 2.7
Average (Dollarization of Deposits < 10%)  14.3 2.6
Argentina  286.4  214.6  617.3 1,115.7 3.5 9.9 -0.3 5.3  2.8 5.9 -0.3 6.6
Honduras  8.4  4.3  14.9 11.3 14.0 5.9 3.8 4.4  3.4 2.6 2.9 2.5
Costa Rica  22.3  26.3  18.2 5.7 12.0 2.8 2.8 5.0  5.0 2.0 4.1 3.3
Average (Dollarization of Deposits > 10% and < 50%) 9.8 2.2
Paraguay  14.7  8.1  23.2 7.5 8.8 1.9 6.5 5.4  3.6 1.9 1.0 1.4
Peru  73.0  39.6  1,227.8 2,428.7 5.2 4.0 1.6 4.8  2.2 8.2 2.7 2.6
Nicaragua  40.4  63.4  2,706.1 3,646.5 9.7 3.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.5 2.0
Uruguay  54.1  15.9  70.7 23.0 12.5 9.0 1.4 5.2  4.0 3.7 -0.5 6.0
Bolivia  1,232.7  3,673.1  39.9 83.2 4.9 4.1 1.2 3.3  3.2 2.3 3.0 1.8
Average (Dollarization of Deposits > 50%)  8.2 2.2
Regional Average  11.2 2.4  
Source: IFS and authors’ calculations.   
 
  39Table 3. Seigniorage Revenues in Latin America by Degree of Dollarization (in percent) 
 
 Country 75-85 86-95 96-02
Brazil 5.2  99.4  2.1 
Venezuela 2.0  2.7  2.7 
Colombia 3.2  2.9  0.8 
Guatemala 1.5  1.5  1.4 
Chile 17.2  7.5  2.9 
Mexico 7.6  2.3  1.3 
Average (Dollarization of Deposits < 10%) 1.9 
Argentina 44.7  60.8  0.9 
Honduras 0.9  1.8  3.3 
Costa Rica  5.0  4.6  0.8 
Average (Dollarization of Deposits > 10% and < 50%) 1.7 
Paraguay 2.8  2.8  0.3 
Peru 10.7  97.1  1.6 
Nicaragua 11.6  739.2 
Uruguay 7.0  12.3  2.3 
Bolivia 125.3  2.5  0.8 
Average (Dollarization of Deposits > 50%) 1.7 
Regional Average  1.7 
Source: IFS and authors’ calculations.
Note: Seigniorage revenues are calculated as the ratio of base money growth to GDP. 
 
 
Table 4. Derivatives Markets in Latin America 
(a) (b) (c)=(b)/(a)
Brazil 4,844 1,881 38.83%
Chile 2,328 635 27.28%
Colombia 394 82 20.81%
Mexico 8,574 4,186 48.82%
Peru 241 36 14.94%
TOTAL LAC 16,381 6,820 41.63%
Israel 738 414 56.10%
TOTAL S.E. ASIA 192,880 129,462 67.12%
TOTAL OECD 1,354,260 1,021,257 75.41%
WORLD TOTAL 1,617,917 1,186,072 73.31%
Source: BIS
(a) = Foreign exchange turnover (Includes spot, outright forward and exchange swap 
transactions).
(b) = Over the counter foreign exchange derivatives (Includes outright forwards, 
foreign exchange swaps, currency swaps, and other products).
 
  40Table 5. Off Shore Dollarization in Latin America (in percent) 
Country 
Onshore dollar deposits + offshore 
deposits 
a 
Onshore dollar loans + offshore 
loans 
b 
ARGENTINA   61.45 
c 74.18 
d 
BOLIVIA  94.13 
d 96.65 
f 
BRAZIL  17.14 
c 38.46 
d 
CHILE  32.53 
c 43.26 
d 
COLOMBIA  30.87 
e 40.86 
d 
COSTA RICA  67.93 
e 52.60 
d 
GUATEMALA  38.18 
e 22.58 
d 
HONDURAS  66.43 
e 40.24 
d 
MEXICO  35.65 
e 44.12 
d 
NICARAGUA  79.23 
e 83.10 
d 
PARAGUAY  83.32 
c 55.46 
f 
PERU  80.81 
c 87.46 
d 
URUGUAY  91.60 
d 61.17 
f 
VENEZUELA  60.50 
d 26.41 
f 
Average LAC  59.98  54.75 




Notes: a Offshore deposits + US$D onshore deposits/offshore deposits + total onshore deposits. Source: BIS.  
b Offshore loans + USD onshore loans/offshore loans + total onshore loans. Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance
(2003). c Data for 2002 d 2001 e 2003 f 1999 g includes: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Thailand and Turkey. 
 
  41Table 6. Prudential Regulation In Latin America 
   Argentina          Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia
Does regulation impose 
restrictions of foreign 
currency deposits? 
No  No 
Yes. To take deposits or to 
issue other liabilities in 
foreign currency, financial 
institutions are required the 
authorization of the National 
Monetary Council (CMN). 
The CMN currently authorizes 
only few specific items, listed 
in the foreign exchange 
regulation .  
No. Banks are allowed to 
receive deposits in foreign 
exchange or index-linked 
to the dollar 
Yes. Foreign currency deposits 
can only be issued to firms in 
export processing zones, 
international transportation 
agencies, travel and tourism 
agencies, firms that offer port 
services, diplomats and 
employees of multilateral 
agencies working in Colombia.  
Does regulation impose 
restrictions of foreign 
currency loans? 
No  No  Yes 
Only for housing loans, 
which are not allowed to 
be done in foreign 
currency. 
No 
Does regulation impose 
limits on other assets or 
liabilities in foreign 
currency 
No        No Yes No
Banks can issue debt abroad or 
domestically with participants of 
the exchange rate market. Such 
debt must be used for loans in 
foreign currency with the same or 
shorter maturity (that require 
previous Central Bank 
authorization), or to cover 
positions in derivatives. There are 
no restrictions for holding other 
assets in foreign currency.   
Does regulation impose 




exceed 30% of 
regulatory capital. 
Yes. Net foreign assets 
cannot exceed 80% of 
capital minus fixed assets, 
nor be lower than -20%. 
Yes. Foreign exchange 
exposure cannot exceed  30% 
of Reference Capital. 
Yes, banks are limited to 
have a net foreign 
exchange exposure, 
weighted for currency 
risk, above 20% of their 
capital, except for 
branches of foreign banks 
which can also hedge the 
foreign currency risk of 
their capital base. 
Yes. Net foreign assets (including 
off balance sheet items, 
contingent liabilities, and foreign 
currency indexed instruments 
executable in pesos) cannot 
exceed 20% of core capita, nor be 
lower than -5%. The difference 
between liquid foreign 
denominated assets and liabilities 
cannot exceed 50% of core 
capital.  
  42Does prudential regulation 
allow for different 
provisions for dollar 
denominated assets vis-à-vis 
local currency denominated 
ones? 
No  No  No No  Only if the bank considers that the 
loan in foreign currency is risky 
Does regulation deal with 
borrowers mismatches?  No      No No
There is a recomendation 
of the Superintendency of 
Banks to take into account 
borrower mismatches 
when clasifyng the 
riskiness of loans 
(required provisions) 
Yes if they affect credit risk. 
Banks are required to use internal 
credit risk models that incorporate 
currency risk explicitly. 
Does regulation require 
monitoring of borrowers 
cash flow? 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Only related to the prior 
point.  Yes 
Does regulation deal with 
off balance sheet  
mismatches? 
 Partially  No   Yes  No  No 
Source: Survey of Central Banks 
 
  43Table 6. Prudential Regulation In Latin America (Cont.) 
   Costa Rica  Mexico  Paraguay  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela 
Does regulation impose 
restrictions of foreign 
currency deposits? 
No       Yes No No No 
Partially. 
Deposits have to 
be withdrawn in 
domestic 
currency.  
Does regulation impose 
restrictions on foreign 
currency loans? 
No 
Yes. There are limits 
on foreign currency 
liabilities that a bank 
can hold. 
No    No No (Under 
Consideration)  No 
Does regulation impose limits 
on other assets or liabilities in 
foreign currency 
No  No  No       No No No
Does regulation impose 
restrictions on currency 
mismatches 
Yes. Net foreign assets 
must be positive and 
cannot exceed 100% of 
capital 
Yes. Banks can hold 
long or short positions 
in foreign exchange 
for up to 15% of their 
total capital.  
Yes. Net foreign 
assets cannot exceed 
12% of previous 
month's risk 
weighted assets  and 
cannot be lower 
than 8%.  
Yes. Net foreign assets 
cannot exceed 100% of 
capital, and cannot be 
lower than -2.5%. In 
addition the capital 
requirement on assets 
affected by currency 
risk is 9.1%. 
Yes, banks have a 
ceiling. Credit risk, 
however is not yet 
considered. 
Yes. Net foreign 
assets cannot 
exceed 12% of 
the bank's capital. 
Does prudential regulation 
allow for different provisions 
for dollar- denominated assets 
vis-à-vis local currency 
denominated ones? 
No, but imposing greater 
provisions on dollar 
denominated debt to 
borrowers in the non-
tradable sector is currently 
being studied. 
NA        No
Only if the bank 
considers that the loan 
in foreign currency is 
risky 
No No
Does regulation deal with 
borrowers mismatches? 
Yes if the bank considers 
that it affects credit risk.  Not specifically  No 
Yes if the bank 
considers that it affects 
credit risk. 
Partially, since it 
allows for private 
valuation of risks. 
No 
Does regulation require 
monitoring of borrowers cash 
flow? 
No  Yes  Yes         Yes As above Yes
Does regulation deal with off 
balance sheet mismatches?  No            Yes Yes Yes No No
Source: Survey of Central Banks. 
  44Table 7. Dedollarization Initiatives in Latin America 
 
   Bolivia  Costa Rica  Paraguay  Peru  Uruguay 
Is there an initiative 
to dedollarize the 
economy? 
Yes          Yes No Yes Yes
What are the 
main 
components? 
The reduction of inflation      
The government has 
introduced debt denominated in CPI-
indexed units to offer alternatives to 
dollar indexation (since 2001).            
Since 2003, public debt 
cannot be indexed to the dollar            
Reserve requirements have 
been adjusted to favor the use of 
domestic currency. 
Research on causes and 
consequences of financial 
dollarization.  
Equalize reserve 
requirements on deposits in 
colones and dollars (deposits in 
Colones used to be higher)           
Improve credit 
screening process of non 
exporter borrowers                        
Charging higher provisions on 
dollar debt is under study.            
The possibility of 
issuing CPI-indexed debt is 
currently under study 
NA 
The reduction of 
inflation to international levels.    
The adoption of 
inflation targeting regime  
The development of 
capital markets in domestic 
currency.                                       
The central bank has issued 
nominal papers at 1 and 2 years 
maturity. 
Recreation of domestic 
currency markets  by introducing 
a CPI indexed unit of account for 
public debt and financial assets.   
Strengthening of the 
safety net of the financial system 
including: higher liquidity 
requirements for dollar 
operations, higher capital 
requirements for dollar loans to 
non tradable sectors and the 
creation of a deposit insurance 
scheme with higher premium in 
USD 
What are the main 
problems that the 
initiative has faced? 
CPI indexation was adopted 
in a period of exchange rate 
depreciation, favoring the use of the 
dollar  
The financial system has 
been in distress 
There is a high spread 
between colones and dollar 
lending rates (9 points) that 
stimulates borrowing in dollars.   
Depositors search for a 
safe currency  
Costa Rica’s immersion 
in the global economy requires a 
certain degree of dollarization 
NA  Economic agents are 
uncertain about future inflation 
Public banks, which are 
large, are the leaders in local 
currency markets and usually use 
them to extract funds to 
subsidize specific areas. There is 
no political support to reform 
public banks.  
There is a perception 
that the cost of credit could be 
increased with tighter 
regulations, hence reforms in this 
area lack political support 
especially because the public 
sector is the largest non tradable 
sector.  
Source: Survey of Central Banks 
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Share of internal 
public debt in 
indexed 
instruments  Definition of indexation measure 
Argentina
a  5%      NA 94% Indexed to CER (Coeficiente de Estabilización de Referencia) 
based on the previous month’s  CPI 
Bolivia  0.5%  0.1%  9%  Previous month's twelve-month variation of the CPI. 
Brazil  0%   
     
     
       
       
     
     
     
0.3% 13% indexed to 
inflation 
Indexed to one of various Brazil’s inflation indexes (IGP-M, 
IGP-DI, IPCA, INPC) 
Chile  27.3% 58.0% 73.1% Previous  month's  monthly variation of the CPI. 
Colombia  0.3% 21.2% 46.0% Previous  month's  monthly variation of the CPI. 
Costa Rica  0% 0% 20.0%
Mexico  0.3%  9.3%  8.2%  Last reported variation in CPI.  
Paraguay  0% 0% 0%
Peru  0%* 0% 0.6% Previous  month's  monthly variation of the CPI. 
Uruguay  NA NA 33.9% Previous  month's  monthly variation of the CPI. 
    Venezuela  0% 0% 0%
Source: Survey of central banks.  
a The data is after pesoification in 2002 
*Peruvian banks issue bonds in CPI indexed units. Currently these account for nearly 4 percent of total bond issuance.   
 
  46Table 9. CPI Indexation in Latin America 
  
Does the financial 
sector use CPI 
indexed 
instruments? 
Does the public 
sector issue debt in 
CPI indexed 
instruments? 
Main problems developing and implementing CPI  indexed instruments 
Argentina  Yes, since 2002  Yes, since 2002   
Brazil  Yes, since the 1980s  Yes, since the 
1980s   
Bolivia  Yes, since 2002  Yes, since 2003  Depreciation has been higher than inflation 
Little information on these instruments is available 
Chile  Yes    Yes None 
Colombia  Yes, since 1972  Yes 
Inflation volatility is high and discourages investors 
Lack of institutional investors with liabilities linked to inflation 
Lack of development of CPI indexed financial liabilities. 
This generated mismatches in banks balance sheets, and constant intervention of the 
central bank to provide liquidity 
The formula to compute the index was changed more than 15 times in 20 years 
Costa Rica  No  Yes, since 1994  Bonds were issued by the government and were purchased by other public sector 
institutions 
Mexico  Yes, since 1995  Yes, since 1996   
Paraguay  No    No 
Peru  Yes, since 1994  Yes, since 2002  The secondary market is very shallow 
Main objective is to develop nominal bonds market rather than CPI indexed market 
Uruguay  Yes, since 2002, but 
a very small scale  Yes, since 2002 
Public banks, which are large, are the leaders in local currency markets and usually 
use them to extract funds to subsidize specific areas. There is no political support 
to reform public banks. 
There are learning costs involved in using new units of account 
The US dollar has traditionally been used to denominate financial assets 
Venezuela  No No   
Source: Survey of central banks.    
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Sample includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 





































































Source: Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003). Sample includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and  Peru. 
  49Figure 3. Macroeconomic Imbalances and Dollarization in Bolivia 
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  50Figure 4. Macroeconomic Imbalances and Dollarization in Peru 
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  52Figure 6. Public Debt in Mexico 
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Source: (a) Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Mexico, and (b) IMF/World Bank (2003)  
 
  53Figure 7. Public Debt in Brazil 
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  56Figure 10. Israel: Maturity Composition of Local Currency Bonds Issuance 
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